And Now,
for the
Silver Lining

Adhemar Altieri

At times, when we focus on specific aspects of Brazilian events, it's difficult to feel optimistic about the current status and future possibilities for the country. So it is sometimes necessary to step away from the news of the moment, take in a broader chunk of what goes on, and hopefully come to some conclusion about where things are headed.

With the exception of the three years (1994-97) that followed the introduction of the Real Plan, Brazil's ride has been generally filled with rough spots in the past several years, some worse than others. There were failed or mishandled economic plans in the eighties, new currencies introduced so frequently that people lost track of the value of money and goods, galloping inflation, lackluster economic growth rates and lately, rising unemployment.

In fact, the nineties began in less than auspicious fashion, with the ousting of president Fernando Collor de Mello for involvement in a still not totally explained corruption scheme. For Brazilian society, it was a tough blow psychologically, because Collor was Brazil's first civilian president elected by a direct vote in close to 30 years. He was supposed to represent a return to institutional normalcy.

Collor's departure, on the other hand, was also a moment of national affirmation and optimism, because he was removed in an entirely proper institutional procedure, not a stereotypical military overthrow, South American style. Society, the media and institutions joined together to apply pressure, and obtain the desired result. Brazil became the only country in the world other than the US (Nixon) to remove a president "by the book".

This brief, highly condensed rundown of the past few years, may leave you wondering whether there's an "up" side to Brazil at all. There is, but to see it, it is essential to deal with trends, general directions and results that span longer periods. Negative events tend to grab a moment's attention and make a lasting impression, but they don't necessarily determine an overall direction.

In a recent article for Brazil's top weekly newsmagazine, Veja, political scientist Sérgio Abranches argued that it is impossible "to seriously sustain the argument that we're much worse off today". And he backed his argument with solid data:

* Social mobility statistics show that 80 percent of Brazilians are better off than their parents were, while 20 percent are worse off;

* Brazil's standing on the UN's Human Development Index has improved steadily since 1970, which means rising income, health and education levels;

* Poverty, which affected 60 percent of all Brazilians in 1970, dropped to 40 percent in 1980, and 20 percent now;

After adding the demise of runaway inflation—a major accomplishment of extreme importance to the poorest on the social ladder—Abranches concludes that Brazilian society, overall, is actually much better off now than it ever was. Does that make Brazil "a tropical paradise" he asks? Of course not—there's no avoiding the inequalities and huge problems—social, economic and structural, that must still be dealt with.

Still, that's probably the best way to put where Brazil currently stands: yes, there's been movement, there are visible and measurable improvements, but it has not been enough and major problems remain unsolved. And as society becomes better equipped to assess what happens, and the democratic game is learned and understood by growing segments of the population, there is also a greater understanding of what is still wrong, where priorities lie, and what must be done.

There's a restlessness in Brazil today, precisely because more and more people have a better understanding of what surrounds them. And a source of growing frustration is the disappointing performance of political structures that should be pushing ahead with what society rightfully wants, and are instead focusing on their own, often small interests, that tend to boil down to simply "getting there"—meaning, getting elected.

A scan of the 15 years since the return of civilian democracy to Brazil in 1985 will show that politicians of all tendencies have had a shot at every level of public administration, except for the presidency where no left-wing candidate has been elected. With very rare exceptions, the end result of most municipal and state administrations and legislatures has been poor. The disappointments pile up, while those worth mentioning for their positive performances are few and far between. This applies federally as well: a quality member of congress or the senate is a very rare bird indeed.

The quality of Brazil's politicians, then, is a very major obstacle to further gains, and society is quickly realizing this. While it has progressed, its elected representatives have not. The most visible expression of what people think is in the monthly surveys that show President Fernando Henrique Cardoso's approval rating—or should we say, more appropriately, disapproval rating.

Cardoso is the most visible of all politicians, and thus, he pays the price, with about a 60 percent negative rating, and only about 12 percent support from voters. To be honest, this ought to be the national rating for all politicians in Brazil—it would not be inaccurate. And this is not to excuse the President, who has missed numerous opportunities that may have changed things profoundly in Brazil, including his own standing with voters.

Many political observers have begun to analyze the current situation in Brazil, and seek ways for the logjam to be broken up. For now, the conclusion seems to be that the country is in for more of the same: gradual, not always steady progress, generally—and hopefully—in the right direction. Whether society will gladly accept that things must move slowly because its mostly inefficient, selfish and corrupt politicians want it that way, is clearly another matter.

Political reform is the obvious solution, but it has been bounced around in Congress for years without significant progress—clearly, those who must forge ahead with it and vote on it, are not terribly interested. The conclusion among many observers has been that the same mindset that helped to get rid of rampant inflation in Brazil, must be installed in order for political and other reforms to one day succeed.

Society now understands the importance of keeping prices under control, and behaves in a manner that will not allow inflation to take off as it did in the past. The next step is for society to feel the same way about changing the ways of its politicians, and applying the pressure that will finally make it happen. Until this level of consciousness is in place, with elected officials responding appropriately, Brazil and its people will continue to endure lengthy, frustrating negotiations, not always made difficult because the parties involved are seeking what's best for the public.

And Brazilians have themselves to look to for an example, when assessing whether such profound changes are in fact possible: they are the ones who accomplished the ouster of president Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. Society was able back then to work together and set things straight. Voters in São Paulo, Brazil's largest city, will soon have the opportunity to show whether at least that particular lesson has been learned: Collor de Mello has thrown his hat in the ring, and will run for mayor of São Paulo in September of 2000.

Adhemar Altieri is a veteran with major news outlets in Brazil, Canada and the United States. He holds a Master's Degree in Journalism from Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, and spent ten years with CBS News reporting from Canada and Brazil. Altieri is a member of the Virtual Intelligence Community, formed by The Greenfield Consulting Group to identify future trends for Latin America. He is also the editor of InfoBrazil (http://www.infobrazil.com), an English-language weekly e-zine with analysis and opinions on Brazilian politics and economy. You can reach the author at editors@infobrazil.com

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