Brazzil
June 1999
PoliticsWelcome
to 2002Instead of swift movement on a series of reforms that have been stuck in Congress for years in some cases, Brazilians are being treated to a blatantly public, often bitter debate involving political leaders who, on paper, are government allies. And there are already candidates stepping forward for presidential elections set for November of 2002!
Adhemar Altieri
Brazilians are generally not familiar with the term "lame-duck", that nifty piece of political jargon Americans often use, that so graphically describes a president going through the motions as a term of office winds down. But things remaining what they are, Brazil's political pundits may soon be searching for the Portuguese-language equivalent of the limping political bird.
Most surprising is that the term is even worth mentioning in a Brazilian context: President Fernando Henrique Cardoso should be anything but lame, having been decisively re-elected for a second term just last November. But outside of a surprising reaction to economic woes early in the year—a reaction attributed almost entirely to a savvy performance by government negotiators—there's been precious little government action to speak of in Brazil. This at a time when decisive steps and strong leadership are called for on a number of fronts, to ensure that a remarkable turnaround since January's economic blues doesn't fritter away.
Instead of swift movement on a series of reforms that have been stuck in Congress for years in some cases, Brazilians are being treated to a blatantly public, often bitter debate involving political leaders who, on paper, are government allies. It's the type of political posturing that characterizes the final stages of an outgoing government, complete with would-be candidates throwing their hats in the ring. Precocious doesn't quite describe it: these are candidates stepping forward for presidential elections set for November of 2002!
Although the origin of much of the current end-of-term atmosphere is the legislative branch, President Cardoso cannot be excused from all blame. Public perception has been that the President is merely gawking while his allies do battle, at times over tiny morsels of power that shouldn't pack enough importance to paralyze all other government activities, but end up doing just that.
Such was the case with the mid-June appointment of the head of Brazil's Federal Police, the local equivalent of the FBI. The appointment would normally be made by the Justice Minister, but the process dragged on for three months because of infighting over which party—the governing PSDB, or one of the coalition partners, PFL or PMDB—would have final say. When the name was finally announced, the result was an embarrassment for the government: Brazil's new top cop was accused of torturing a priest to extract a confession during Brazil's military regime that ended in 1985. The government had no choice but to drop him, and a new appointment was rushed through in just three days.
How does the appointment of a lower-rung public servant become a politically-charged battle, with party leaders drawing successive lines in the sand and threatening to pull their support from the government? In part, because of a perceived lack of leadership and decisiveness from President Cardoso to deal with political allies and their ambitions. And also because the political system in place in Brazil opens numerous doors to just the type of bartering that turns even a lesser government position into a potential political stronghold—a practice not entirely unknown to politics elsewhere, but taken to often unacceptable heights in Brasília.
The basic elements of the Brazilian political formula make it all possible. They come together in a mind-boggling tangle that most participants prefer to simply navigate and often cash in on, than attempt to pull apart. The many personal advantages that such a system makes accessible certainly don't escape the average Brazilian politician. All of which goes a long way in explaining why political reform, considered a priority by government and opposition members alike, has gone nowhere since 1993, when the first attempt to review the system failed miserably.
To most Brazilian legislators, it comes down to not giving away what amounts to a very convenient arrangement: they get to bog down negotiations until they extract what they want from the government in exchange for a vote, and they seldom pay the political price for the negative consequences of such delays. The President usually bears the brunt of the criticism, mainly because of Brazil's not-too-distant political past. Brazilians still see the presidency as all-powerful, and tend to expect their President to be far more incisive and even authoritarian than Fernando Henrique Cardoso has been throughout his presidency.
Without reform, the Brazilian political scene will remain a minefield of sorts for the presidency, and an obstacle to long-term stability and modernization. Major aspects that need an urgent review include mandatory voting, the lack of electoral districts, the lack of any serious limitation on politicians who hopscotch between parties without regard for voters or political tendencies, the ease with which just about anyone can start a new political party, and a serious imbalance in Congressional representation that privileges remote, less-populated regions.
Each of these aspects has profoundly negative effects, but together, they create a situation that University of São Paulo political scientist Bolivar Lamounier has described as an "option for minority government". The existing system in effect reduces all political dialogue to individual, not party or ideology-based negotiations. It guarantees overall control for party and regional minorities as Lamounier put it, while coherent majorities with the effective power to govern cannot be formed. "It's as if the political minority, whatever its nature or method of formation, should be considered somehow ethically superior to the majority", wrote Lamounier in a recent column in the business magazine Exame.
In the end, an early start to the 2002 presidential race may turn out to be the most harmless consequence of avoiding reforms in Brazil. Far more damaging would be the threat of economic collapse, a real possibility if budget deficits are not controlled. And to get control, Brazil needs political, tax and social reforms on the front burner soon, all of which must be successfully concluded or well under way by the end of 1999 if trouble is to be avoided.
Whether or not President Cardoso sets some sort of record as the earliest-ever lame-duck President will depend on his ability to shift attention to matters at hand. For now, the apparent disregard for the incumbent that early campaigning by political allies represents, is providing additional bad news for Cardoso. The latest polls show his approval rating is at an all-time low, with only 23 percent of Brazilians supporting his administration. That compares to 44 percent at the start of his first term in office, in 1995.
Adhemar Altieri is a 21-year veteran with major news outlets in Brazil, Canada and the United States. He holds a Master's Degree in Journalism from Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois, and spent ten years with CBS News reporting from Canada and Brazil. Altieri is a member of the Virtual Intelligence Community, formed by The Greenfield Consulting Group to identify future trends for Latin America. He is also the editor of InfoBrazil (http://www.infobrazil.com), an English-language weekly e-zine with analysis and opinions on Brazilian politics and economy. You can reach the author at editors@infobrazil.com
