The U.S.-Brazil connection became more significant at the beginning of the 20^th century. The Barão do Rio Branco (1845-1912), Brazil's foreign minister, saw that the U.S. influence and interest in Latin America had grown in the wake of the Spanish-American war. Rio Branco decided that it was preferable to have the Yankees as allies than as rivals. Brazil then became a loyal colleague of the U.S. in Pan-American relations while other Latin American countries (such as Mexico) decried Yankee imperialism.

In the years before World War II, Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas (1883-1954) was amenable to Italy and Germany as well as to the U.S.. While the U.S. reduced its purchases of Brazilian exports, Germany increased them. According to historian E. Bradford Burns, Germany had become by 1938 the biggest custom for Brazilian cotton, and a plurality of goods imported to Brazil were German-made.

The U.S., apprehensive about Vargas's political and economic flirtation with fascism, decided to insure that Brazil would remain an ally of the U.S.. The persistence of the State Department and Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha (a longtime Vargas associate who disapproved of his friend's authoritarian streak) paid off in 1942. Brazil declared war on Germany and Italy.

Unlike other Latin American nations, Brazil sent army troops to Europe. This expeditionary force of 25,000 men participated in the liberation of Italy. Perhaps the greatest effect of Brazil's role in the World War II was the friendship that developed between the officers of the expeditionary force and their U.S. counterparts. The Brazilian officers frequently became enthusiastic about the U.S. and Yankee technological advances. This Americanophilia would contribute to events in Brazil some 20 years later.

After the end of World War II, however, cracks began to develop in the "unwritten alliance" between Brazil and the U.S.. The creation of Petrobrás—the state oil monopoly—in 1953 did not please the U.S. government, which distrusted the prospect of a nationalized oil industry. Furthermore, President Juscelino Kubitschek's 1958 proposal to establish Operation Pan-America (a cooperative attack against underdevelopment, run by and for Latin Americans) was received coldly by the U.S.. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles even ridiculed Kubitschek's pretensions and called Brazil "the world's largest banana republic."

Kubitschek's 1959 decision to break off negotiations with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) was mostly due to domestic political considerations—Kubitschek had been elected president on a pro-development platform, and cutting back on development in order to reduce inflation would hurt Kubitschek's political future—but he apparently resented the condescension that the U.S. government had displayed to Brazil and to its president.

Conditions worsened in the early 1960s, during the presidency of João Goulart (1961-1964). While Brazilian government funds went to left-wing candidates in the 1962 congressional and gubernatorial elections, the U.S. poured money into the coffers of more conservative candidates. After the military coup of 1964, many Brazilians who remembered how the U.S. government had financially supported Goulart's opponents assumed that the U.S. had a direct role in his downfall. It is true that the U.S. government wanted Goulart out and even planned to give the anti-Goulart forces military support if the coup did not automatically succeed. However, the coup—whose leaders included former expeditionary force officers such as Marshal Humberto Castello Branco and General Golbery do Couto e Silva—prevailed without direct U.S. support. 

During the first dozen years of Brazil's military regime, U.S.-Brazilian relations were good, but not a high policy priority for the U.S. government. By the time that Jimmy Carter became president of the U.S. in 1977 the "special relationship" was dead. Carter and the U.S. Congress criticized the poor state of human rights in Brazil (which included censorship, stripping public officials of their positions and civil rights, as well as imprisoning and torturing suspected conspirators against the military regime).

Perhaps even worse in the eyes of the U.S. government was Brazil's desire for nuclear technology. In 1975, the Brazilian government decided to buy atomic generators from West Germany. The technology that the West Germans would supply included not just the requirements to run nuclear power plants, but also the ability to produce enriched uranium. Enriched uranium is necessary to maintain a supply of reactor fuel and for producing explosive devices.

Since Brazil had not signed the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the U.S. government feared that Brazil would eventually make its own bomb. The Carter administration attempted to persuade the Brazilian and the West German governments to repeal the agreement, but Brazilian President General Ernesto Geisel and his government only stiffened their resolve. This defiance was well-received in many Brazilian circles. Even though Carter was fairly conciliatory during his 1978 state visit to Brazil, the U.S. was no longer a parent whose requests must be obeyed at the risk of reprimands or punishment.

Both Brazil and the U.S. are large, multiethnic federal republics, and might eventually establish a more equal and constructive relationship. As Schneider wrote in his 1996 book Brazil: Culture and Politics in a New Industrial Powerhouse, "the faster Brazil develops and comes to grips with its social problems, the sooner this will be; the less acrimonious the discord until that time, the more easily it will come about." 

Historian Thomas Skidmore has been one of the leading Brazilianists in the U.S. over 35 years. His books— such as Politics in Brazil, 1930-1964, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985, and Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought—have become modern classics indispensable for understanding 20^th century Brazil. In a March 1997 interview with Cláudia Trevisan of daily newspaper Folha de São Paulo, Skidmore, who teaches at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island, was delighted that U.S. interest in Brazil is on the upswing.

"There are definitely more people interested in Brazil nowadays than there were in 1961," Skidmore said, referring to the year he began specializing in Brazil. "There are at least 30 books published each year in the U.S. that are exclusively about Brazil."

This popularity has not risen consistently. During the 1970s, Brazil's apparent "economic miracle" attracted students interested in developing the Brazilian economy even more. The number of students taking Portuguese language and Brazilian history courses in U.S. colleges and universities increased.

Unfortunately for the budding field of Brazilian studies, the next decade destroyed those small advances. "Throughout the '80s and up to 1995, nobody looked at Brazil because it was chaotic," Skidmore said. The Center for Brazilian Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, closed for lack of funds in 1987. By 1990, only 6,211 students in U.S. universities and colleges were enrolled in Portuguese language courses. Brazil had lost its position as "flavor of the month" in Latin American studies to Central America, especially El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

The troubles of Brazilianism in the U.S. were not solely due to events within Brazil's borders. Many American colleges and universities have had difficulty in fundraising and the relatively recondite field of Brazilian studies became a low priority. 

Brazil is geographically distant from the U.S., and Brazilian society is also quite complex. Its official language, Portuguese, is not widely spoken elsewhere in the Americas. Professors who are fluent in Spanish, however, can easily change their field of specialization within Latin American studies. This is especially true during Latin American political crises which attract attention in the U.S.. Students and the general public become more interested in the country in the headlines. This usually assures the availability of funds to study the talked-about nation. Also, most Latin Americanists specialize in societies that are less diverse than Brazil's (therefore easier to understand and explain). These countries are often much geographically closer to the U.S. as well.

In addition, as Carlos Eduardo Lins da Silva of Folha de São Paulo observed last March, the Brazilianists who made their reputations in the 1960s and '70s—Thomas Skidmore, Riordan Roett, Albert Fishlow, John W. F. Dulles and Timothy Harding, among others—are either approaching or have passed retirement age. During the past 20 years, these scholars have not found many students who are willing to risk specializing in the poorly-funded field of Brazilian studies.

The growth in size and significance of the Spanish-speaking Latino community in the U.S. has also lessened interest in Brazil. At the high school level, the interest in Portuguese, which was never very high, has decreased even more. The descendants of early 20^th century Portuguese immigrants to the U.S. and Canada have largely assimilated into Anglophone North American society, while more recent immigrants from Brazil are a drop in the oceanic Latino community.

These difficulties have left a curious impression of Brazil in the minds of the U.S. public, Skidmore asserts. "They think the capital is Buenos Aires and that Spanish is spoken in Brazil. I don't believe that there is much knowledge of the country."

But ignorance does not mean apathy. "One area in which there is a lot of curiosity but little understanding, is race relations," Skidmore continued. "After Brazilian music, perhaps this is the characteristic that fascinates Americans most."

Once Americans begin studying how race and class is judged in Brazil, they quickly realize that the "racial democracy" image that sociologist Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987) popularized is a myth. "But they also discover that relations are different than they are in the U.S.," Skidmore said. "What happens with my students, several of my friends, and even myself is that we spend a lot of time trying to understand what makes Brazilian culture tick. And race relations is just one aspect of that."

Attempting to help Americans understand what makes Brazil tick are new Brazil-focused centers, chairs, and departments in U.S. universities. In 1992, Brown University created the Department of Portuguese and Brazilian Studies, the first autonomous and interdisciplinary institution in the U.S. since Johns Hopkins' Center for Brazilian studies shut its doors. The University of Texas in Austin opened the Brazil Center in 1995, and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso came to Stanford University in March 1996 to establish the Joaquim Nabuco Chair in Brazilian Studies. This is the first chair in any U.S. university dedicated to just one country in the Southern Hemisphere. First Lady Ruth Cardoso likewise opened the Brazilian program within the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Pittsburgh in October 1996.

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, the University of California in Berkeley and Los Angeles, the University of Florida in Gainesville, and Columbia University in New York City are also prominent in the development of Brazilian studies in the U.S.. Harvard, Princeton, and Yale Universities are planning to catch up by raising funds for their own chairs in Brazilian studies. Meanwhile, the Woodrow Wilson Center and Inter-American Dialogue in Washington, D.C. have invited Riordan Roett, the former director of Johns Hopkins' Brazilian program, to help establish a similar center in the nation's capital.

The creation of the Brazilian Studies Association (Brasa) in 1994 is another sign of the growing interest in things Brazilian. Some 500 Brazilianists throughout the U.S. are expected to attend Brasa's convention in Washington, D.C.. this November. During the convention—which hopes to be the largest in Brasa's brief history—a WEB site and a guidebook describing all the Brazilian studies programs in the U.S. are expected to be introduced.

Despite this growing interest, the Brazilian government has done little to publicize Brazil's image in the U.S., "especially in the cultural area," Skidmore noted. "They are doing a little more now, with Itamaraty (Brazil's Foreign Ministry) promoting the arrival of Brazilian academics in America. But in general Brazil is doing very poor work, especially when compared to Mexico or Chile."

Why study Brazil? Skidmore replied, "It's a fascinating society. Understanding Brazil's culture and history is a wonderful window to understand our own culture. (...) I think that Brazil is an important building block, because it's so similar to the U.S. as to seem recognizable, but different enough to force students to think."

The survey of 200,000 business executives from 80 countries showed that Latin American executives usually are more comfortable with rigid hierarchies and working in groups than their North Americans counterparts. Latin American executives are also more anxious when faced with unfamiliar situations, tend to view conflict as a threat, and prefer referring to rules. However, Latin American executives are more inclined to consider their personal lives more important than professional success.

As for Brazilians in particular, they are said to be less individualistic and more tolerant of inequality in the workplace than even their Argentine neighbors. According to the survey, Brazilian executives believe that lack of access to superiors is to be expected. Brazilians and Argentines both value dedication, professional ambition and decision-making ability more than other Latin American executives, the survey stated. Brazilians are also more disposed than other Latin Americans to accept competition and conflict.

Receiving 38 percent of Canadian exports to South America, Brazil is currently Canada's largest commercial partner in the region. This is by no means a new enterprise: Canada was Brazil's greatest foreign investor during most of the 20^th century. More recently, however, Canadian investments in Brazil have decreased. In 1996, Canadian businesses in Brazil invested $3.2 billion. This is insignificant compared to what Canadian businesses spent in Chile during the same year. Although Chile's gross national product is ten times smaller than that of Brazil, Canadian businesses invested a grand total of $8 billion in Chile. In the wake of privatization in Brazil (especially of the Vale do Rio Doce, a mining company and in the telecommunications field), Canada hopes to increase its investments there. Thus Canada plans to strengthen the century-old bond between the economies of the two nations.

Canadian foreign policy currently seeks to diversify its exports and reduce its extreme dependency on its powerful neighbor just south of the border. To get an impression of that dependency, one need only note the fact that the U.S. absorbs 81 percent of all Canadian exports. According to Kathryn McCallion, undersecretary for commerce and investments in Canada's Ministry of External Relations, the planned increase of Canadian investments in Brazil is happening just when the U.S. is having difficulty in managing the economic opening in the Americas. The main reason is because the U.S. Congress is resisting President Bill Clinton's "fast track" plan. This proposal would allow the president to bypass Congress and sign commercial treaties between the U.S. and other countries. The Yankee impasse spurred Canada's decision to seek commercial accords independent of NAFTA, such as the treaty with Chile.

However, occasional disagreements with the U.S. have not transformed Canada into a defender of Brazilian economic positions. "The rate of integration is the most visible difference between Brazil and Canada," McCallion told Cláudio Camargo of Brazilian weekly newsmagazine Isto É last April. "We understand that Brazil opened its economy, first with Mercosul, and now it's being invited to expand this opening to a much larger market that includes the USA. The objection we're making is because of Brazil's attitude of saying that everyone has to wait until the country's ready."

The economic links between Canada and Brazil began in 1896. In that year, Captain F. A. Gualco, a resident of Toronto, and Augusto de Souza, the brother-in-law of the governor of São Paulo state, established São Paulo's first electric tramway system. Frederick S. Pearson, an American engineer, raised most of the capital needed in Canada, principally from stockholders in the Canadian Pacific Railway. The São Paulo Tramway, Light and Power Company Ltd. was incorporated in the Canadian province of Ontario in 1899. Alexander Mackenzie of Toronto then went to Brazil as the company's first manager. By 1904, all of São Paulo's trams were electrically powered, and the company then built a much bigger system in Rio de Janeiro. The company also took control of Brazil's telephone system and gas company.

The Brazilian Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., as the overall operation became known, was quite successful until the Great Depression of the 1930s. After that, it had an increasingly difficult time. During the administration of President Getúlio Vargas, the Brazilian government had officially fixed tramway fares. Since Brazil had a high inflation rate, costs for maintenance and replacement equipment cut into the company's profits.

After World War II, Brazilians became increasingly critical of the company's foreign ownership. In response, the company moved its headquarters to Brazil and named a Brazilian as its chief executive officer. In 1962, the government of President João Goulart expropriated the telephone holdings in Rio. The following year, it took over the last of the tramway systems.

In 1969, the company changed its name to Brascan and began diversifying its holdings. Ten years later, it sold its Light Serviços de Electricidade S.A. to the Brazilian government. Brascan is now a huge holding company with the bulk of its investments in Canada. Nevertheless, Brascan still has extensive holdings in Brazil — including real estate, tin mining and tourism.

Brazil

Area: 3,286,170 square miles (8,511,965 square kilometers)

Gross National Product (1995): $696 billion

Per capita income (1995): $4300

Canada

Area: 3,621,616 square miles (9,970,610 square kilometers)

Gross National Product (1995): $566 billion

Per capita income (1995): $19,120

Brazilian-Canadian relations (1996)

Bilateral commerce: $2.5 billion

Brazilian exports to Canada: $1.1 billion (iron and steel, coffee, machines and ore)

Canadian exports to Brazil: $1.4 billion (wheat, mineral fuel, newsprint and potassium)

Canadian investments in Brazil: $3.2 billion

Canadian firms in Brazil: 30 (Main investors: Alcan, Brascan, Inco, Canada International, Moore Business Forms and Seagram. Areas of interest: mining, telecommunications and computing)